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OKLAHOMA
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VOLUME 46 SPRING, 1993 NUMBER 1
FOREWORD
JUDITH L. MAUTE*
L Symposium Issue on the Evolving
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers
The University of Oklahoma Law Review is honored to publish this symposium
issue. It was presented under the auspices of the Professional Responsibility Section
of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) during my term as section
chair.' Although the project of writing the Restatement had been underway for
six years, the section leaders perceived that very few professors or practicing
lawyers were acquainted with it. We decided- to fill this void by dedicating our
1993 Annual Meeting to a symposium on the Restatement. By doing so, we wanted
to develop both a wider understanding of this important work-in-progress and to
evaluate existing troublesome issues, in hope that thoughtful scholarly input could
improve the final product.
We organized the symposium around several questions: What is the intended
scope of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers? Is it necessary? After
all, the legal profession recently completed a widespread debate over ethics rules,
culminating in adoption of the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. Almost forty states have now adopted some version of the
* Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law. L.L.M., 1982, Yale Law School; J.D.,
1978, University of Pittsburgh; A.B., 1971, Indiana University.
1. AALS is the national organization and accrediting body devoted to improvement of the legal profes-
sion through legal education and serves as the learned society for law faculty. AssocIATON OF AM. LAW
SCH., 1992 HANDBOOK 1. The University of Oklahoma College of Law is honored that Dr. Rennard
Strickland, director of the Center of Native American Law and Policies Studies, is President-elect of the
AALS. He will preside in this important and prestigious position during the 1994 calendar year. Most
AALS activity takes place within sections organized by substantive areas of law or other interests. The
Professional Responsibility Section membership includes approximately five hundred law faculty who
teach or write in this field.
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Model Rules with local modifications.2 What role would the Restatement play on
issues addressed in t&e Model Rules?
We focused on two substantive issues, conflicts of interest and client confidential-
ity, which were debated intensely within the American Law Institute (ALI). Re-
garding conflicts of interest, section 204 permits a private law firm to create a
screen, or wall of separation, between a lawyer whose prior representation creates
a conflict, and the rest of the firm. The Model Rules and prevailing case law
explicitly reject the use of private screens unless the tainted lawyer was disqualified
because of prior government employment? By what authority does the ALI reverse
the accepted view, and what prompted it to do so? Considerable controversy also
surrounded the confidentiality provisions,'and, more specifically, exceptions permit-
ting disclosure of a client's intended crime or fraud in order to prevent death, seri-
ous bodily injury, or substantial financial loss. The proposed exceptions extend far
beyond those allowed by ABA Model Rule 1.6(b), but rejected by many jurisdic-
tions.4 Given the current disarray among states, what justifies the ALI to select its
own normative vision'?
We also wanted to address issues relating to criminal defense representation, a
practice area often overshadowed by civil litigation and high dollar business transac-
tions. Finally, we welcomed input on what the Restatement might do regarding
lawyers' civil liability for professional shortcomings. The Model Rules have had
limited impact in this area because of a clever disclaimer that rule violations do not
give rise to a cause of action, or create a presumption that a legal duty has been
2. The Oklahoma Bar Association Model Rules Study Committee evaluated each rule, considered
the extent to which it chang-.d Oklahoma law, and whether it stated an appropriate legal standard. The
committee proposed approximately 25 changes to the text or comments of the ABA rules. In November
1986, the Oklahoma Bar Association House of Delegates considered the rules and without significant
debate, recommended adoption by the supreme court. In March 1988, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
adopted the rules. 5 OKLA. STAT. ch. 1, app. 3-A (effective July 1, 1988); see JUDITH L. MAUTE,
PRACTIONER's GUIDE TO THE OKLAHOMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr (1989). The author
served as ex officio reporter to the rules committee. Since 1988, Oklahoma has adopted several amend-
ments, the most significant ielating to confidentiality. See infra note 4.
3. See MODEL RULES CF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rules 1.9 to 1.11 (1983, as amended).
4. Rule 1.6(b) of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct recently was amended, reflecting
ongoing consideration and refinement of the difficult policy issues concerning exceptions to confidentiali-
ty. The amended version in..ludes a new subsection (b)(2), permitting disclosure as needed to rectify
harm caused by the client's misuse of the lawyer's services. It provides, in relevant part:
(b) A lawyer may reveal, to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary, infor-
mation relating to representation of a client:
(1) to disclose the intention of the client to commit a crime and the information
necessary to prevent the crime;
(2) to rectify the consequences of what the lawyer knows to be a client's criminal
or fraudulent act in the commission of which the lawyer's services had been used,
provided that the lawyer has first made reasonable efforts to contact the client but
has been unable to do so, or that the lawyer has contacted and called upon the
client to rectify such criminal or fraudulent act but the client has refused or is
unable to do so.
64 OKLA. BJ. 436 (Feb. 13, 1993).
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breached
Several prominent scholars agreed to address the annual section meeting and to
prepare their remarks for publication in the Oklahoma Law Review. The distin-
guished panel included both persons actively involved with the Restatement project
and thoughtful outside observers. This symposium issue contains polished versions
of their remarks. The presenters were: Charles W. Wolfram, the Charles Frank
Reavis Sr. Professor, Cornell Law School, Chief Reporter for the ALI Restatement
of the Law Governing Lawyers, and author of a leading professional responsibility
treatise; Professor Theodore J. Schneyer of the University of Arizona, the leading
scholar on the politics and dynamic process of legal self-regulation; Susan R.
Martyn, the Andersch-Fornoff Professor of Law & Values at University of Toledo,
who serves as an adviser to the Restatement; Stanford Professor Kim A. Taylor,
former director of the Washington, D.C., Public Defender Service; Professor Fred
C. Zacharias of the University of San Diego, who has written extensively on issues
of confidentiality; and Victor B. Levit, San Francisco practitioner, member of the
Restatement consultative group, and noted author in the area of legal malpractice.
In 1986 the ALI undertook the ambitious task of assembling a comprehensive
restatement of the law applicable to the practice of law. The Restatement encom-
passes the broad range of law affecting legal practice, whether expressed in the
doctrines of professional discipline, evidence, agency, contracts, or tort Initially,
the project was expected to take at least five or six years. Now, after seven years,
much work remains before presenting the Restatement to the ALI for final adoption.
Hopefully, this will occur in the next three or four years.
This Restatement project follows the established ALI structure, consisting of a
complex system of examining the substantive drafting in each tentative draft at
multiple levels of review. The ALI's long history of producing authoritative and
5. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope (1983). Courts are split on the effect of this
disclaimer. See, e.g., Miami Int'l Realty Co. v. Poynter, 841 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1988) (legal malpractice
action based on breach of professional duty to client causing lost profits from time-share project);
Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 936 (6th Cir.) (violation is "some evidence" of required conduct),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Elliot v. Videan, 791 P.2d 639,642 (Ariz. 1989) (malpractice was not
established by violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, but was evidence of malpractice); Fishman
v. Brooks, 487 N.E.2d 1377, 1381-82 (Mass. 1986) (canon of ethics or disciplinary rule violation is not
itself an actionable breach of duty to a client); Lipton v. Boesky, 313 N.W.2d 163, 166-67 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1981) (violation creates rebuttable evidence of malpractice); Carlson v. Morton, 745 P.2d 1133,
1137 (Mont. 1987) (crux of decision in negligence suit relies on proof of breach of legal duty, not on
breach of code of ethics); Garcia v. Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, 750 P.2d 118, 123 (N.M.
1988) (violation does not give rise to private cause of action for damages against attorneys); Lazy Seven
Coal Sales v. Stone & Hinds, 813 S.W.2d 400, 404 (Tenn. 1991) (Code of Professional Responsibility
was not intended to establish a private cause of action for infractions of disciplinary rules but creates
remedy solely disciplinary in nature); Harington v. Pailthorp, 841 P.2d 1258, 1262 (Wash. 1992)
(violation of Rules of Professional Conduct does not give rise to an independent cause of action against
attorney); Hizey v. Carpenter, 830 P.2d 646, 654 (Wash. 1992) (experts on attorney's duty of care may
properly base their opinion on attorney's failure to conform to ethics rule in action for legal malpractice).
6. Charles W. Wolfram, The Concept of a Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, I GeO. J.
LEGAL ETHics 195, 201 (1987) [hereinafter Wolfram, The Concept of a Restatement].
7. Id.
19931
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persuasive restatements depends upon the dedication of leading scholars, judges, and
practitioners with relevant expertise to serve in various capacities - as chief or
associate reporters, advisers, or members of the consultative group. First, the re-
porters produce a tentative draft for review and comment by the project advisers and
consultative group. After further revisions from the reporters and approval by the
advisers, the Institute council and membership review this draft and vote, first on
individual sections and finally on the entire proposed restatement.8
This issue of the Oklahoma Law Review is the first symposium on the Restate-
ment of the Law Governing Lawyers. As such, it serves an important role in the
development of law. Lawyers from all fields of practice should acquaint themselves
with the proposals ard voice any concerns to those working on the project or to
members of the prestigious American Law Institute. When finally adopted, the
Restatement is likely to affect all practicing attorneys. Unlike the open-ended,
democratic debates surrounding the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the ALI
restatement process i; relatively closed, with limited input from the most distin-
guished (and elite) practitioners, judges, and scholars.9 Without fuller input, the
final version may overlook some important issues. The following articles are pre-
sented to stimulate greater consideration of the Restatement among the practicing
bar and scholars.
The Restatement is about law and not ethics. Professor Wolfram addressed what
he describes as a sometimes uncomfortable fit between the Restatement and legal
ethics. He defines the term "legal ethics" narrowly, to include any "normative
statement or quality ascription that one might apply to the actions of a lawyer or
law firm except narrowly legal statements or ascriptions. ' The uncomfortable fit
occurs in restating well-settled law which professionals may regret for ethical rea-
sons. Future drafts will contain the following disclaimer limiting the Restatement
to questions of law and not ethics:
We take this occasion to remind readers that, as with all work on this
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, this draft aims to restate
the law. It reflects decisional law and statutes and takes account of the
lawyer codes in its formulations. The formulations are a statement of
the law applicable in malpractice and disqualification proceedings and
other contexts to which that body of law is applicable. It also may
inform the interpretation of the lawyer codes in disciplinary and similar
proceedings. Because this is a Restatement of the Law, the black letter
and Comments do not discuss other important subjects, such as matters
of sound professional practice of personal or professional morality or
ethics. Such other non-legal considerations may be referred to in the
8. Id. at 199.
9. See Theodore J. Schneyer, The Restatement and the Model Rules: Rivals or Complements?, 46
OKLA. L. REV. 25, 27 (1993).
10. Charles W. Wolfram, Legal Ethics and the Restatement Process- the Sometimes-Uncomfortable
Fit, 46 OKLA. L. REv. 13, 13 (1993) [hereinafter Wolfram, Uncomfortable Fit].
[Vol. 46:1
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Reporter's Notes, but those discussions do not, as is traditional, consti-
tute the position of the Institute."
Professor Wolfram gave two reasons why the Restatement limits its scope to law,
and not ethics. First, it is limited so courts deciding questions of liability do not
become confused and find that suggestions for "sound professional practice" consti-
tute enforceable, normative legal rules. Second, the Restatement is not intended to
reconsider the fundamental questions of professional ethics so intensely debated
around the Model Rules. Rather, it aims to restate existing law, as articulated in
most jurisdictions. Where the law is not settled, the reporter has discretion to
recommend any common law proposition supported by existing case law." In that
respect, any restatement holds the possibility for significant law reform.
Professor Schneyer addressed the most basic question: Why have a Restatement
of the Law Governing Lawyers? Prior restatements focused upon distinct areas of
substantive law and were successful because of the strong commitment to disin-
terested legal craftsmanship. By contrast, this Restatement draws upon many diverse
areas of law, bound together only by their application to the practice of law. He
cautions that "intervening in the Balkans is often futile and always risky."'3 Over-
all, he's not so sure it was a good idea. 4 His metaphor to the international Balkans
conflict nicely frames the issue. What are the consequences when an elite
organization such as the ALI shifts the center of gravity in defining relevant law
from the more inclusive and democratic processes of the ABA? He explores areas
where the Restatement is a competitive rival to the Model Rules, as well as those
areas in which they are complementary. In some cases, the Restatement overlaps
with and diverges from the rule formulation, which could undermine the ABA's role
as lawgiver. The Model Rules' reach clearly is not limited to issues of discipline;
numerous provisions have their greatest application in other contexts. 5
Professor Martyn focused on Restatement section 204, which directly conflicts
with the Model Rules' prohibiting the use of private law firm screens to avoid
disqualification based on a prior representation. She analogized section 204 to a
mutt one adopts from the pound as a puppy: it draws from several genetic strains,
but there is no way to predict which will become dominant as the dog (or the law)
matures.' She sketched the provision's development as framed by internal division
among advisers. The final version reflects victory by the "pragmatic majority" over
the "purist minority."17 She criticizes the debate for focusing on the wrong issues
11. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS at xxiii-xxiv (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1992);
see also Wolfram, Uncomfortable Fit, supra note 10. See supra text accompanying note 5.
12. Wolfram, Uncomfortable Fit, supra note 10, at 16-17.
13. Balkanization of the law is a term reflecting the extent of fragmentation and conflict among
jurisdictions on any given issue.
14. Schneyer, supra note 9, at 26.
15. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rules 1.10, 1.13, 1.5, 1.8(a) (1983); Sch-
neyer, supra note 9, at 29-30.
16. Susan R. Martyn, Conflict About Conflicts: the Controversy Concerning Law Firm Screens, 46
OKLA. L. REV. 53, 53 (1993).
17. Id. at 56.
1993]
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and warns of an uncertain future. 8 If private screening follows the genetic strain
from securities law, it may impose endless duties of implementing and monitoring
each screen and create the risk of civil liability and loss of fees if such measures
are inadequate. 9 The alternative is to live without the dog (private screens) and
avoid conflicts of interest by taking greater care to preserve and nourish existing
professional associations.'
Professor Taylor identified several areas in the Restatement warranting more
attention on problems peculiar to representation of indigent criminal defendants.
Later drafts should intersperse additional illustrations and comments focusing on this
unique practice context. For example, the Restatement should acknowledge the
nonconsensual formation of the client-lawyer relationship and endorse adherence to
established standards for appointment.2' Commentary should refer to the lawyer's
duty to avoid case overloads that impair effective representation. Section 44(3)(g),
permitting counsel to withdraw from "unreasonably difficult" representations, should
recognize the inherent problems of mistrust and define appropriate efforts to
improve the relationship before seeking to withdraw.' Institutional indigent
defenders need guidance on handling conflicts between the individual and group
interests of the clients they represent. Professor Taylor joined those who denounce
the Restatement for replacing traditional espousal of zealous advocacy with a duty
of reasonable diligence. "[Z]ealous representation does not necessarily invite wild
posturing. ' Especially in this practice context, the failure "to impress upon the
lawyer that effective representation of an indigent accused requires that she [act]
zealously ... [may] prevent the client from receiving fair treatment in the criminal
justice system.'
Professor Zacharias criticized the manner in which section 117 purports to state
the majority view on the limited exceptions to confidentiality, when in fact, it
reflects the reporters' view of the "best approach."' This disguised reform effort
conflicts with established ALI tradition of disinterested drafting. The advocacy
approach used in drafting a relatively controversial position while appearing to
restate the law will be readily apparent to the legal community and ultimately may
detract from the overall value of the Restatement." Instead, he prescribed a
specially crafted drafting approach for when the Restatement seeks to reject a
majority view: identify and explain why the ALI adopts a new position; demon-
18. Id at 58.
19. Id. at 59; see also Mon'oe Freedman, ALl to Clients: DROP DEAD!, LEGAL TIMES, May 31,
1993, at 26.
20. Martyn, supra note 16, at 61.
21. Kim A. Taylor, Reading Between the Lines: Indigent Defense Issues and the Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers, 46 OKLA. L. Rev. 63, 65 (1993).
22. Id. at 67.
23. Id. at 68.
24. I at 66.
25. Id.
26. Fred C. Zacharins, 7e Restatement and Confidentiality, 46 OKLA. L. REv. 73, 75 (1993).
27. Id at 82-83.
[Vol. 46:1I
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strate why the respected membership agreed to abandon the prevailing view of state
ethical codes; and substantiate its judgment by evaluating empirical data on how the
state rules actually operate.u
Mr. Levit surveyed the topics that will be covered in the pending chapter on
malpractice. He predicted future developments on questions of civil liability relating
to permitted disclosure of confidences and the whole conflicts area arising from
screening, nonconsentable conflicts, and financial relationships between client and
lawyer.29
Lively audience discussion ensued from these thought-provoking presentations.
Comments spanned the spectrum: will the Restatement impede future development
in the law? What will become of Professor Martyn's puppy - is section 204 little
more than Silver Chrysler?' How should the Restatement address the effect of
ethical violations on civil liability? West Virginia Professor Carl Selinger shared his
critique of tentative comment language regarding an advocate's effort to discredit
the testimony of a truthful witness. For this symposium, he probed further into the
policy and limited legal authority that permits discrediting in the context of criminal
defense. He proposes inclusion of a comment stating "that existing law implicitly
condemns the practice outside of criminal defense representation."'" ALI recogni-
tion that discrediting is illegitimate would boost confidence in the adversary system
as an instrument of justice and make it clear that this practice has no place in civil
litigation.3
I. Significance of the Restatement
A. Advanced Stage of Legal Development
Although we will not see the final result for some time, the Restatement is im-
mensely important, even while tentative in form. It represents a new maturity in the
law of lawyering. Professor Nancy Moore argues that under the Model Rules, the
legal profession has attained a very advanced stage of development among
professions:
Indeed, codes themselves have been distinguished according to their
stage of development. Typically, they begin as a simple set of ideas to
which adherents aspire, then move to a "second-level" code, which
28. Id. at 83.
29. Victor Levit, The Effect of the Restatement on Rules of Malpractice, 46 OKLA. L. REv. 87
(1993).
30. See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975)
(leading case limiting when a lawyer is disqualified because of a former representation). The Tenth
Circuit recently denied disqualification in a bankruptcy case where the substantial relationship test was
satisfied, but the court determined the information was not sufficiently material to the current matter. See
SLC Limited V v. Bradford Group West, Inc., 999 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1993).
31. See Carl M. Selinger, The "Law"on Lawyer Efforts to Discredit Truthful Testimony, 1993 OKLA.
L. REv. 99, 105 (1993).
32. Id. at 106.
19931
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contains more stringent language and is designed to be enforced, and
finally advance to a "third-level," in which the standards for proper
practice are so clearly laid out that "[w]hat is left is little more than a
quasi-criminal code enforced by a professional society rather than a
constitutional government." With the adoption and enactment of the
Model Rules, the legal profession may be the first to achieve a true
"third-level" code. (Indeed, given their unique legal status, the Model
Rules might be fairly characterized as initiating a new "fourth-level"
status, perhaps unattainable by any other professional code.)33
All professions are subject to some law beyond that of their own codes. The
extent of noncode law varies by profession and its depth of involvement in soci-
etyfr Over two centuries, the legal profession has become involved in all facets
of American life. It is hard to imagine any aspect of modem society that is not in
some way affected by the long reach of the law. (Perhaps lawyer-bashing exists in
part because the law and its practitioners are annoyingly ubiquitous.) Lawyers are
at the heart of much lawmaking, whether through legislation, regulation, or litiga-
tion. Disputes frequently arise about the scope, effect, and consequences of lawyer
involvement, thus producing a far-ranging law of lawyering. Many diverse strains
of law exist, primarily having in common their connection to the practice of law."
The Restatement represents the next developmental stage. As contrasted with
ethics codes, which define permissible standards of conduct, the Restatement at-
tempts to combine the diverse judicial, statutory, and code formulations into one
comprehensive document. The mere undertaking of this project reflects the ALI's
judgment that the Model Rules left many important issues unresolved and a continu-
ing need to reflect upcn the law of lawyering.'
The Restatement seeks to further professional education by addressing gaps in
lawyers' understanding of the law as it applies to their practice." Lawyers unfamil-
iar with this body of law act at their peril. Knowledge of the disciplinary rules is
not enough. Under the evolving law governing lawyers, one's acts or omissions
may result in criminal or civil liability or court-imposed sanctions. Unfortunately,
many in the practicing bar lack sufficient working knowledge of this developing
law.
33. Nancy J. Moore, The Usefulness of Ethical Codes, in [1989] 1 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 7, 15.
34. Compare, for example, the medical and architecture professions: almost everyone obtains
medical care sometime in their life, but relatively few persons elect to retain the services of an architect.
The frequency and nature of medical services increase the risk of conflict, and hence prompts develop-
ment of an exhaustive comrron law.
35. Schneyer, supra note 9, at 25.
36. Wolfram, The Concept of a Restatement, supra note 6, at 196. The Restatement project should
not be taken as a hostile rejection of the Model Rules. Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard served as reporter
to the ABA Commission on the Rules of Professional Conduct, and shortly after their adoption, became
Director of the American Law Institute. The project undoubtedly reflects his judgment that the project
was both justified and complementary to the ABA Rules.
37. Wolfram, The Concept of a Restatement, supra note 6, at 198-99.
[Vol. 46:1
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Any restatement effort involves a dynamic relationship between the ALI and the
courts, legislatures, and regulatory agencies. Although the ALI may give its blessing
with the membership voting to approve the final version, it has no authority to make
law. Even with the prestige of the ALI's pastworks, a given restatement provision
serves only as persuasive authority and cannot bind local decision makers. State
courts are free to adopt or reject any section. Prior restatements have drawn upon
innovative state court opinions to fill a perceived gap in the law."
A dynamic relationship between state law and a restatement can move in both
directions to produce law reform. This phenomenon may be occurring in Oklahoma,
where a tentative Restatement provision has influenced judicial decision making.
Tentative Restatement section 48(2)(b) permits a lawyer to loan or guarantee a loan
to a client when necessary to enable the client to withstand delays in litigation and
make settlement decisions on the merits and not because of financial hardship. Two
Oklahoma Supreme Court cases question whether a lawyer can be disciplined for
making humanitarian loans to clients. In Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Smolen,39 the
parties stipulated that prohibited loans were made and agreed to the sanction of
public censure. Justice Yvonne Kauger, sua sponte, challenged the validity of Rule
1.8(e), the ethics rule prohibiting loans to litigation clients. Her dissent asserted that
the rule unconstitutionally impairs access to courts by impoverished litigants and
violated section 48(2)(b). Justices Wilson and Summers dissented without opinion.
Justices Opala and Hodges concurred with the decision to censure, but urged the bar
association to reconsider Rule 1.8(e) in light of the tentative Restatement provision.
At the direction of the Oklahoma Bar Association Board of Governors, the Commit-
tee on Rules of Professional Conduct has given the matter extended consideration.
In August 1993, the Committee presented without recommendation a proposed
amendment fashioned after Restatement section 48(2)(b). Although the Board of
Governors rejected the amendment, the issue remains alive with the supreme
court.' Having given the bar an opportunity for considered legislative action, the
possibility remains for the supreme court alone to amend the rule pursuant to its
supervisory authority over the bar. The rules committee was aware of this risk and
considered well spent its time in researching, investigating, and debating the issue.
If Oklahoma Rule 1.8 is ultimately amended to permit loans to clients for necessary
38. The most notable analogous situation arose while the second Restatement of Contracts was
underway. Professor E. Allan Farnsworth, reporter to the Restatement of Contracts (Second), related a
prior example of the interaction between the courts and the restatement process. In Drennan v. Star
Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958), the California Supreme Court drew upon an obscure comment in
the first Restatement as authority for using promissory estoppel as a consideration substitute, preventing
revocation of an offer on which there had been substantial reliance. The Restatement (Second) codified
the Drennan principle in section 87(2). See E. Allan Farnsworth, Ingredients in the Redaction of The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 81 CoLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1981).
39. 837 P.2d 894 (Okla. 1992).
40. See, e.g., Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Carpenter, 64 OKLA. B.J. 2002,2006 (June 26, 1993) (Kauger,
J., dissenting) (stating that "the provision of humanitarian, non-interest bearing loans to clients does not
warrant discipline").
1993]
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living expenses, this Oklahoma experience will achieve national prominence exem-
plifying the dynamic relationship between the restatement process and state law.
B. Making Explicit the Distinction Between Law and Ethics
As Professor Wolfi'am discusses, the Restatement deals with law and not ethics.
By explicitly distinguishing between the two, the Restatement performs an important
educational function for the legal profession. In defining the extensive body of
existing law, the Restatement directs lawyers to evaluate with legal analysis many
issues that previously have been dismissed as imponderable ethical matters about
which reasonable minds can differ.
Many lawyers do not understand the important distinction between "law" and
"ethics." Law creates binding obligations with formal sanctions for noncompli-
ance t By contrast, ethics relate to questions of moral judgment, including both
personal ethics and the discussion of moral philosophy as it relates to the profession.
Ethics are not subject to formulation as narrow legal statements.
42
Lawyers' colloquial use of the term "ethics" coincides with this distinction.
Discussion of ethical questions may provoke lofty considerations of virtue, but not
discrete legal principles that demand reasoned analysis about whether the proposed
course of conduct is legally permissible. Law sets boundaries that cannot be crossed
without the risk of adverse consequences. By defining a question as one of ethics,
many lawyers are oblivious to the possibility that case law, rules, or statutes may
address the situation and set limits on permissible conduct. Such labeling preserves
for lawyers vast discretion to do what they want, unimpeded by legal constraints.
Thus, resolving a question of ethics is often reduced to gut reaction. Years of
practice tend to toughm one's moral sensibilities, with the result being that very
little causes moral discomfort.4' Accordingly, lawyers can find justification to
pursue almost any chosen course of action, while seldom pausing to consider
whether the analysis must at least begin with examination of the applicable law.
41. Webster's New World Dictionary defines "law," in relevant part, as "3. something that gives
binding force to a law, or secures obedience to it, as the penalty for breaking it, or a reward for carrying
it out. 4. something, as a moral principle or influence that makes a rule of conduct, a law, etc. binding."
WEBSTER'S NEw WORLD DCnONARY 788 (2d coil. ed. 1982).
42. Webster's defines "ethics," in relevant part, as "I. the study of standards of conduct and moral
judgment .. " Id. at 481; see also Wolfram, Uncomfortable fit, supra note 10.
43. See, e.g., Diane E. Ambler, The Securities Bar, Lateral Hiring Conflicts, INSIGHTS, June 1992,
at 7 (conflicts of interest antlysis often rests on little more than gut reaction); see also JOHN WILuAM
•CORRINGTON, THE SOUTHERN REPORTER (1981) (a collection of short stories about ordinary practicing
lawyers). In one passage, an elderly gentleman lawyer describes to a young associate the callousness that
comes from years of practice:
One of the results of aging in the law is that you are not easily gotten to. By the time you
have been at it thirty or forty years, you have done so many things no one should have
to do that something has drained out of you, to be replaced with the law, like a creature
trapped in mud which is hard pressed for a long, long time, leaching away the soft parts,
making everything oier. In stone.
Id. at 69; see also Judith L. Maute, Book Review, 37 OKLA. L. REv. 635, 637 (1984).
[Vol. 46:1
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The confusion between law and ethics is at least partly attributable to the history
of professional regulation and the ethical discretion given to lawyers under the prior
codes. The 1908 ABA Canons of Professional Ethics represent a typical first stage
of development, focused mostly on listing a simple set of aspirational ideals." The
ABA gave little thought to the need for possible enforcement mechanisms. Unwrit-
ten but shared notions of professionalism encouraged voluntary compliance; those
who deviated from the ethical precepts risked professional ostracism. For the next
sixty years, the law developed slowly. As expected, the Canons were seldom used
for discipline. Sparse dicta scattered among reported decisions sketched some basic
principles derived from agency, tort, contract, and constitutional law. Relatively few
cases addressed the propriety of a lawyer's conduct in the context of liability or
discipline.
The 1969 ABA Code of Professional Responsibility - the second level of code
development - represented an important step in defining enforceable duties. Its
tripartite structure attempted to isolate obligations of virtue (or legal ethics) from
binding statements of law. Narrow statements of law, the violation of which would
subject a lawyer to discipline, were contained in the Disciplinary Rules (DRs),
whereas the aspirational statements were contained in Ethical Considerations
(ECs).4s Despite the drafters' good intentions, the line between law and ethics often
blurred. Sometimes courts borrowed from the Ethical Considerations to determine
legal obligations. At other times the Disciplinary Rules were ambiguous, giving the
lawyer much discretion to decide whether or not a rule should apply. Thus, it was
sometimes uncertain whether the resolution to a question was one of law or of
ethics. Lacking both a coherent and identified body of law defining lawyers'
obligations outside the disciplinary context, and a clear understanding of the existing
rules, many lawyers regarded the ethical codes as minor impediments. Lawyers
were not yet accustomed to analyzing questions arising under the Code as matters
of law, evaluated with the familiar tools of research and legal reasoning.
Starting in about 1970, the development of the law of lawyering quickened. With
much greater frequency, courts used the Code as authority for imposing discipline
or in determining other disputes regarding lawyers' conduct. Disqualification mo-
tions based on conflicts of interest became a popular strategy to disarm an effective
litigation opponent. This heightened activity provoked a new level of serious schol-
arship concerning legal ethics.
Although the Code was a significant improvement over the 1908 Canons, brief
experience revealed several problems. Some provisions were vague or triggered
circular reasoning; gaps caused courts to borrow from the aspirational Ethical Con-
siderations; the advertising restrictions were soon found unconstitutional. In an
important article, Professor Thomas Morgan criticized the Code's misplaced priori-
ties, in which the interests of lawyers and the legal profession received top priority,
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followed by the client's interests and, last, the public interest.4 Meanwhile, the
Watergate Scandal provoked strong public reaction against the legal profession and
internal reflection about why so many lawyers were involved with the illegal con-
duct. The ABA responded to these developments in two ways. First, in 1974 it
mandated that accredited law schools require students receive instruction in the
duties and responsibilities of the legal profession. Second, in 1977 it created the
Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards (commonly known as the
Kutak Commission), which produced the Rules of Professional Conduct, and even-
tually adopted in 1983.
Both efforts have had a tremendous effect upon the legal profession. All who
graduate from an accredited law school have received some training in the law of
lawyering. Wide variance exists among instructors, but at least the recent genera-
tions of lawyers are aware that "legal ethics" involves more than a gut reaction.
Those who graduated since adoption of the Model Rules have an even stronger
orientation to analyze "ethical" problems as also raising questions of law susceptible
to traditional research and analysis.
The Model Rules set forth lawyers' minimum legal obligations as "black letter
law" in a restatement format. They are "user-friendly" in organization and format,
containing terminology that uses legal terms understandable to the average practitio-
ner. Critics lament that they eliminate Ethical Considerations, or any other discus-
sion of professional goals and aspirations. One could say that "the only thing
missing from [our code of ethics] is the ethics."4 While one may wish for other
mechanisms that will instill shared professional values, experience has shown that
this function does not mix well with the need for clearly articulated, enforceable
rules of conduct.
The ABA and local bar associations continue to seek more effective ways to
identify and promote discussions of professionalism and true ethical concerns.
However, great diversity exists among American lawyers based on locale, size and
type of practice; applicable legal constraints vary accordingly. Above all else,
lawyers need to know the law which impacts upon their daily practice. Personal and
professional ethics may prompt them to comply voluntarily. Whether it is high
moral standards or aversion to sanctions that motivates compliance, the end result
is ultimately what counts. Together with the Model Rules, the Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers will help educate the practicing bar about the legal risks
they encounter.
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